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Abstract  
The omnipresent COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to a parallel spreading of misinformation, also 
referred to as an ‘Infodemic’. Consequently, social media have become targets for the application of 
social bots, that is, algorithms that mimic human behaviour. Their ability to exert influence on social 
media can be exploited by amplifying misinformation, rumours, or conspiracy theories which might be 
harmful to society and the mastery of the pandemic. By applying social bot detection and content 
analysis techniques, this study aims to determine the extent to which social bots interfere with COVID-
19 discussions on Twitter. A total of 78 presumptive bots were detected within a sample of 542,345 
users. The analysis revealed that bot-like users who disseminate misinformation, at the same time, 
intersperse news from renowned sources. The findings of this research provide implications for 
improved bot detection and managing potential threats through social bots during ongoing and future 
crises. 
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1 Introduction 
Social media have become a powerful communication tool for the procurement and dissemination of 
information (Varol et al. 2017). Especially during extreme events, social media are used to engage with 
online contacts and to stay informed (Mirbabaie et al. 2020; Mirbabaie and Marx 2019). The same 
applies to the infectious Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), which turned out to be one of the most 
discussed events on social media in recent years. However, apart from human users, social bots, that 
is, algorithms programmed to mimic human behaviour on social media platforms, also have been 
found engage in online discussions (Stieglitz, Brachten, et al. 2017). Scholarship distinguishes between 
benign social bots, which were designed with good intentions, and malicious bots. The aim behind 
malicious social bots may include altering other humans’ behaviour or distorting the opinion climate 
in social media communities (Ferrara et al. 2014; Ross et al. 2019). However, examples in the recent 
past have shown that, without proper monitoring, also benign bots can turn malicious. For instance, in 
2016, Microsoft’s Tay had to be shut down due to obscene and inflammatory tweets it had learned 
from other Twitter users (Neff and Nagy 2016). Furthermore, the unregulated nature of social media 
entails the dissemination of information of questionable credibility (Wattal et al. 2010). The spread of 
misinformation, defined as “false or inaccurate information, especially that which is deliberately 
intended to deceive” (Lazer et al. 2018), poses a serious threat to public health during pandemics 
(Zarocostas 2020). The amplification of the spreading of misinformation by social bots becomes 
problematic if the health information and contributions, for example, contain information that can 
influence the public opinion in a wrong way and thereby impede public health measures. 
The distribution of health information, which is not consistent with information from evidence-based 
sources, is a problem that emerged at the beginning of this century (Eysenbach 2002; Kim and Dennis 
2019). Since then, the quantity and dissemination of misinformation have grown in unprecedented 
ways (Shahi et al. 2020). Information epidemiology, or infodemiology, is an emerging research field, 
which focuses on the determinants and distribution of health information in an electronic medium 
and specifically the internet. It aims to identify areas of knowledge translation gaps between the best 
evidence provided by experts and what most people believe (Eysenbach 2002). Research in this area 
remains crucial since the diffused health information can alter the effectiveness of the 
countermeasures taken by the government and also spread hysteria which can have a negative impact 
on the mental well-being of social media users (Rosenberg et al. 2020). Within the information 
systems discipline, a debate has been launched that questions the ability of IS research to actually help 
fight pandemics such as COVID-19. Scholarship that contributes to infodemiology and provides 
knowledge about ‘infodemics’ containment, we argue, can make an important contribution. Thus, in 
this study, we focus on the detection of social bots with a malicious intent, i.e. spreading rumors and 
unverified information. The research is guided by the following research question: 
RQ: To what extend do social bots affect the Twitter discussion about COVID-19 by disseminating 
misinformation? 
In order to answer this research question, we apply social bot detection techniques based on three 
metrics: Tweet Uniqueness (TU), Tweet Frequency (TFQ), and Friends-Followers-Ratio (FFR). The 
underlying data set covers a period of 12 weeks of twitter communication about the COVID-19 
pandemic and includes 3,052,030 tweets authored by 542,345 users. Subsequently to the bot 
detection, a manual content analysis was conducted to identify misinformation among the social bot 
content. Consequently, this study aims to contribute to scholarship on infodemiology by characterizing 
social bots and their role during an ‘infodemic’. We further provide a basis of discussion about social 
bot detection and provide implications for practitioners to better control malicious social bot content.   
In the remainder, we provide a literature background, explain our methodical approach and present 
preliminary results. To conclude this paper, the next steps of this research-in-progress are presented. 
2 Related Work 
2.1 Infodemiology 
The term infodemiology is a portmanteau of information and epidemiology and can be defined as the 
science of distribution and determinants of disease in populations and information in an electronic 
medium, specifically the Internet and social media (Eysenbach, 2009). The latter is defined as “a 
group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of 
Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.” (Kaplan and 
Haenlein 2010). It has the ultimate aim to provide public health professionals, researchers, and policy 
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makers with the required tools and information to influence public health and policy decisions 
(Eysenbach 2002, 2009). This research area initially focused on the identification of misinformation. 
Since then, the term has been used to analyse the relationship between the demand for health 
information, which can be investigated for example through web queries analysis, and the supply of 
health information, for which supply-based applications are carried out like social media analysis 
(Zeraatkar and Ahmadi 2018). 
Metrics and approaches of infodemiology are an integral part of health informatics, the most popular 
sources being Twitter and Google. The potential and feasibility of using social media to conduct studies 
with an infodemiological approach has been demonstrated in previous studies (Mavragani 2020; 
Mavragani et al. 2018). Eysenbach (2002), who first proposed the term ‘infodemiology’, suggested 
during the SARS pandemic that the use of population health technologies, such as the Internet, can 
help detect outbreaks of the disease at an early stage. During the H1N1 pandemic, an infodemiological 
approach was used called ‘infoveillance’, which describes the usage of infodemiology methods for 
surveillance purposes. This study illustrated the potential of using social media to conduct 
infodemiological studies and showed that H1N1-related tweets on Twitter were primarily used for the 
dissemination of information from credible sources, but also included many opinions and experiences 
(Chew and Eysenbach 2010). Another infoveillance study on this subject matter identified main topics 
that were most discussed by Twitter users and additionally analysed the sentiments of the tweets (Abd-
Alrazaq et al. 2020).  
2.2 Social Bots 
Typically, crises communication on social media is dominated by customary actors such as individuals 
from the general public, affected organisations, and influential individuals such as politicians, 
journalists, and influencers (Mirbabaie and Zapatka 2017; Stieglitz, Bunker, et al. 2017). Emerging 
actors in this context are social bots (Brachten et al. 2018). The identification of bot accounts is of 
increasing interest in research and society, especially on Twitter (Bruns et al. 2018). Recent studies 
have been conducted to describe how bots are used to amplify messages on social media (Brünker et al. 
2020; Vosoughi et al. 2018) or how fake content is populated on Twitter (Gupta et al. 2013). In 
general, social bots are automated accounts that exhibit human-like behaviour with either malicious or 
benign objectives (Ferrara et al. 2014). The detection of social bots has become more complex because 
social bots become increasingly sophisticated. In this respect, it has become more difficult for 
individuals to distinguish between a human and a social bot account (Freitas et al. 2015). Considering 
that between 9% and 15% of active Twitter accounts might be bots (Varol et al. 2017), the detection of 
social bots on social media poses a fundamental challenge. 
Recent work has also focused on how social bots can bias discussions within social networks (Ferrara 
et al. 2014; Ross et al. 2019). For example, social bots successfully influenced political discussions and 
even had an effect on the outcomes of elections (Brachten et al. 2017; Ferrara 2017). Social bots are 
also applied for spamming and thereby diverting attention from discussed issues (Bradshaw and 
Howard 2017) or overstating trends (Brachten et al. 2018). For this purpose, social bot strategies like 
smoke screening, astroturfing, and misdirecting are used (Stieglitz, Brachten, et al. 2017). Messias et 
al. (2013) and Zhang et al. (2013) show that social bots can cooperate to manipulate the influence 
scores of several centrality measures. Twitter, for instance, already took countermeasures against bots 
with the goal of reducing the impact of such accounts’ malicious actions and therefore targeted 
accounts that had been actively used to amplify and disseminate news of questionable sources 
(Onuchowska et al. 2019). However, with unprecedented amounts of communication and emerging 
phenomena such as the COVID-19 ‘infodemic’, it remains imperative to conduct research that aims at 
understanding the technological enablers and misinformation mechanisms behind social bot activity.  
3 Research Design 
3.1 Case Description 
After the first appearance of the infectious respiratory coronavirus disease in Wuhan, China, it vastly 
spread in China and other countries around the world (World Health Organization 2020a). The 
disease is also known as COVID-19 and causer of a global crisis. For Germany, the virus has not been 
as unpredictable as other emerging infectious diseases because in Germany the first cases have been 
confirmed on January 28, 2020 while in China the first cases have been confirmed on January 11 
(World Health Organization 2020b). The opportunity for individuals to share their own stories, 
feelings, opinions, judgments, or evaluations about the virus on social media channels did not just lead 
to an increase of individual activity but also social bot activity on online social platforms such as 
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Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube (Abd-Alrazaq et al. 2020; Laato et al. 2020). To further investigate 
the spread of misinformation, an infodemiological approach is going to be conducted, where the idea 
of the field is to measure the pulse of public opinion, attention, behaviour, knowledge and attitudes by 
tracking what people do and write on the Internet (Eysenbach 2009). 
3.2 Data Collection 
The data used in this study was collected via the Twitter API which is a commonly used tracking 
method since it enables researchers to retrieve a wide range of meta-data (Stieglitz, Mirbabaie, et al., 
2018). Overall, data was crawled during the time period of February 27 (0:00 UTC) to May 20, 2020 
(23:59 UTC) by applying a self-developed Java crawler using the Twitter4J1 library and saving it in a 
MySQL database. In general, three separate crawling processes were conducted because new relevant 
hashtags and terms appeared in the public discourse over the course of time, for example, after the 
coronavirus got an official name by the WHO in February. The first crawling process tracked the 
following terms: Coronavirus, nCoV2019, WuhanCoronaVirus, WuhanVirus, CoronaVirusOutbreak, 
Ncov2020 and coronaviruschina. To retrieve a reliable dataset, a second and third data crawling were 
conducted by tracking tweets using at least one of the terms Covid19, covid-19, covid_19, sarscov2, 
covid, cov, corona, corona Germany, #COVID19de, #coronapocalypse, #staythefuckhome, 
#flattenthecurve, and #stopthespread. The third data crawling contained specific terms which were 
especially popular in German-speaking tweets. Finally, all three crawled data sets were merged, and 
duplicates were removed, representing the foundation for this research. The tracking yielded a total of 
542,345 users creating 3,052,030 tweets. A directed retweet network for further analyses is created, 
consisting of users (vertices) and retweets (edges). 
3.3 Social Bot Detection 
Only highly active users are considered for the creation of a sample in this research because the activity 
is also reflected in the likelihood of the account to be a bot (Ferrara et al. 2014). To this end, accounts 
which posted at least 150 tweets within two weeks during the tracking period were considered highly 
active. Tweets, retweets and mentions are included in the dataset to cover the entire spectrum of 
Twitter communication. For the identification of bot-like accounts, the dataset was preprocessed, i.e. 
deletion of unnecessary meta data and exclusion of inactive users. The social bot identification as well 
as the preprocessing were performed by using R which is a free software environment for statistical 
computing and graphics (Nordhausen 2015). Three metrics are considered for the identification of the 
most social bot-like users: (1) the Tweet Uniqueness (TU), (2) the Tweet Frequency (TFQ), and (3) the 
Friends-Follower-Ratio (FFR) and for every metric, a specific threshold was derived to create a sample 
of potential social bots (Brünker et al., 2020). 
 
Figure 1. Social Bot Sampling Procedure (adapted by Brünker et al., 2020). 
The TU quantifies the particularity of the content of a tweet. For the computation of this measure, the 
number of distinct tweets is divided by the total number of tweets k by the user, according to (Ross et 
al. 2018). A tweet is unique if the tweet alters in at least one character from every other user's tweet.   
The TU will equal 1 if every tweet by a user is different from others and the more identical tweets a user 
publishes the more this value decreases. The global TU in the dataset, which is the number of unique 
tweets divided by the total number of extracted tweets, serves as the threshold every user must fall 
below in order to be classified as a potential bot (82,692/117,678 = 0.703). 
A high tweet frequency is and indicator for bot-like behaviour (Brachten et al. 2017; Varol et al. 2017). 
The TFQ displays the activity of a user during the tracking period and is calculated by dividing the total 
number of tweets of the user by the number of hours of the tracking period. For example, a TFQ of 3 
means that the user publishes three tweets per hour each day. In this regard, the threshold of 1.042 
must be exceeded in order for the user to be assigned to the social bot sample. In this case it means 
that a user must have disseminated at least 25 tweets a day during the tracking period. 
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The FFR indicates the relation between the friends and the followers of a user. In recent studies, the 
relation between a users’ friends and followers was considered for social bot detection (Chu et al. 2012; 
Ferrara et al. 2014). The relationships on Twitter are unidirectional, i.e. if a user A follows the user B, 
then A is a follower of B and A’s friend is B. The ratio is calculated by dividing the total number of 
friends by the total number followers of a user and the result must exceed the threshold of a ratio of 
3.5. Calculating a global FFR resulted in a way too low value which has led to a congested social bot 
sample because most of the active accounts have been assigned to the sample. The minimum FFR was 
set 3.5 so that, for example accounts with 1,000 followers must be friends with at least 3,500 other 
users in order to be classified as potential bots. 
4 Preliminary Results 
Overall, 380 accounts, who are responsible for 117,678 tweets, are considered highly active within the 
dataset. 20,5% (78 accounts) of them meet at least one of the conditions and are therefore classified as 
likely social bots. These, in turn, disseminated 19,117 tweets throughout a 12-week time period. The 
manual content analysis has been conducted for the 78 classified accounts.  
Table 1 shows selected examples of tweets by some of the alleged bots. The tweets contain 
misinformation or conspiracy content, but the mentioned users did not disseminate this kind of 
content solely. In particular, there are also retweets of news and updates about the virus. None of the 
accounts in the social bot sample could be classified as a social bot based on a single tweet. However, 
analysing the account’s characteristics according the metrics TU, TFQ or FFR allows to better classify 
the distinct accounts. Particularly some accounts significantly surpassing the threshold of the metric 
TFQ. For instance, one account created 3,967 tweets, including news, many hashtags, and links to 
related websites or retweeted his own tweets. 
 
User Tweet #Retweets 
@C***64K**z RT @WaltiSiegrist: The worldwide biological weapons research of the 
USA #SARSCoV2 #coronavirus #covid19 
20 
@F***R*5 RT @lobbycontrol: Did #party donations play a role in the occupation 
of the #NRW-#Corona Council? More than 1.1 million Euro flowed 
2002-2017 from the company #Trumpf and its owners to #CDU 
(765.766 €) and #FDP (335.000 €). Trumpf is represented on the 
council by the billionaire Nicola #Leibinger-Kammüller 
67 
@L****iB RT @hfeldwisch: How #Taiwan prevented the #COVID19 outbreak in 
his country - and the @WHO doesn't want to know about it: Exciting 
article by Richard Friebe @TspWissenschaft 
0 
Table 1. Selected examples of social bots spreading misinformation or conspiracy theories. 
5 Conclusion and Next Steps 
The aim of this research is to determine the extent of the impact social bots have on the network by 
disseminating misinformation or conspiracy theories and to provide an evaluation on whether the 
identified social bots can be considered a threat measured by their influence. Particularly, in this 
global pandemic, social bots have been neglected so far and the objective of this research is to gain new 
insights into how social bots are applied in this context. For this purpose, this research-in-progess 
carried out the first steps of data collection, preprocessing and manual analyzing. 
The manual assessment of bot-like accounts that entered the sample as they passed over the 
thresholds defined by Brünker et al. (2020) revealed that their impact on the COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ is 
very limited. However, the analysis provides valuable insights that help us to better understand online 
behaviour that is relevant to an ‘infodemics’ context. Those mechanisms do not only apply to social 
bots but can be transferred onto other social media users trying to exert influence within an 
‘infodemic’ environment. 
However, the number of relevant tweets grew during the data acquisition process. As a result, some of 
the tweets among the hashtags examined were not tracked in time and no absolute completeness of the 
data set can be guaranteed. To properly analyse the high number of tweets in our dataset, an 
automated content analysis may be applied as part of the future work. Since “automated accounts are 
particularly active in the early spreading phases of viral claims” (Shao et al., 2017, p. 11) and there is 
missing data between the first infection and the beginning of the data crawling, namely January 11 to 
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February 27, it is possible that many social bots were not caught or already blocked or deleted by 
Twitter itself.  
To analyse the impact of these social bot accounts on the dissemination of misinformation and 
conspiracy theories, their individual PageRank value within a retweet network can be calculated and 
compared. As a next step, the PageRank score can be evaluated within a created retweet network of the 
identified accounts. PageRank is a variation of the Eigenvector centrality measure which considers 
network information, i.e. users who are closely related to influential users, to quantify the influence of 
a node (Bonacich 1972). It is developed for directed graphs such as retweet networks and integrates 
the flow of influence to calculate the authority of a node in a network (Yang and Tang 2012). The 
PageRank scores of the social bots can be compared to other users’ scores and on the basis of this, 
statements about the impact of the social bots throughout the network can be derived. 
Moreover, the tweets of social bots are likely to be retweeted because misinformation spreads faster 
than information from credible sources (Shu et al. 2020). Also, social bots can cooperate and thereby 
reach a higher PageRank value than other users (Messias et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2013). In this case 
and additionally, a tweet of a social bot is retweeted by other influential users, the bot is very likely to 
be considered influential as well. Depending on the results of the PageRank algorithm and the 
identified bots being influential or not, they can be classified as threat or harmless. 
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